Privacy is a major concern in RFID systems, especially 
Introduction
A passive radio-frequency identification (RFID) tag is a microchip that is capable of transmitting a static identifier or serial number for a short distance. It is typically activated by a query from a nearby reader, which also transmits power for the operation of the tag. Nowadays, RFID is used in a wide variety of applications, from the small plaques mounted on car windshields for the purpose of automated toll payment to the theft-detection tags attached in shops to consumer goods, and the proximity cards used to control physical access to buildings.
Privacy is a significant concern that needs to be addressed in terms of tag anonymity and tag untraceability when RFIDs are to be as widely deployed as conceived by proponents. Tag anonymity requires that the tag ID should be kept anonymous in order to solve the problem of leaking information pertaining to the user belongings. Tag untraceability requires that the output of the tag should not be constant in order to avoid adversary tracking. If the output of the tag is fixed, the adversary can easily track the tag. In addition, in the worst case, i.e., secret information in the tag can be obtained by an adversary due to the tag being not the tamper-resistant hard-ware, forward security is required for preventing an adversary from tracking the past events.
In this paper, we focus on providing a security model for solving the above privacy issues and analyzing the recently proposed RFID authentication protocol named anonymous RFID authentication protocol [1] proposed by Shen et. al., in order to show its vulnerability. Until now, a rigorous treatment of privacy for RFID models is still being developed. It is worth
Related Works
The success of RFID tag implementations depends on addressing privacy and security issues surrounding the use of RFID tags. People always hope that their privacy and security are able to be protected. However, a majority of existing RFID tag implementations are not secure, even though the RFID technology increases the safet y of food and drugs through proper monitoring and counterfeit prevention. These tags can broadcast information about their presence so that an adversary can silently track and monitor the presence of an RFID tag from a distance without the knowledge of the person holding the tagged object [6] . Lots of researches focus on designing authentication protocols in RFID-tagged systems to protect the privacy and security of the use of RFID tags. Interested readers can refer to recent survey papers [7] for more details.
Many simple challenge-response protocols have been proposed. The Ohkubo-SuzukiKinoshita protocol (OSK) [8] made forward privacy possible. A few attempts have been made to really formalize privacy in RFID protocols. One of the first attempts was made by Avoine [2] . Following their model, privacy is formalized by the ability to distinguish two known tags. Juels and Weis [3] extended this model using side-channel information and making the two target tags chosen by the adversary. Another model was propos ed by Burmester and de Medeiros [4] . Our security model is defined based on Juels and Weis model. Recently, Shen et.al proposed an anonymous RFID authentication protocol [1] . However, under the well defined security model below, it is vulnerable to active attacks and violates the privacy requirements.
Security Model and Definitions

Model
Communication between readers and tags is provided via a wireless network, upon which third parties can easily eavesdrop and which is easily cut or disturbed. A protocol party is a ∈Tags or ℛ∈Readers interacting in protocol sessions as per the protocol specifications until the end of the session upon which each party outputs Accept if it feels the protocol has been normally executed with the correct parties. Adversary controls the communications between all protocol parties (tag and reader) by interacting with them as defined by the protocol, formally captured by 's ability to issue queries of the following form: Execute(ℛ, , i) query. This models passive attacks, where adversary gets access to an honest execution of the protocol session i between ℛ and by eavesdropping.
query. This query models active attacks by allowing the adversary to impersonate some reader U 1 in some protocol session i and send a message m of its choice to an instance of some tag U 2 . It is worth noting that U 1 can also be tag and U 2 can be reader.
Corrupt( , K) query. This query allows the adversary to learn the stored secret K'of the tag , and which further sets the stored secret to K. It captures the notion of forward security or forward privacy and the extent of the damage caused by the compromise of the tag's stored secret.
Test(U, i) query. This query is the only query that does not correspond to any of 's abilities or any real-world event. This query allows to define the indistinguishability-based notion of untraceable privacy (UPriv). If the party has accepted and is being asked a Test query, then depending on a randomly chosen bit b∈{0, 1}, is given b from the set { 0 , 1 }. Informally, succeeds if it can guess the bit b. In order for the notion to be meaningful, a Test session must be fresh, which means the party has not been sent a Corrupt query.
Privacy Definition
It is worth noting that anonymity can be easily achieved, so we define the untraceability in detail here.
Definition 1 (RFID Untraceable Privacy)
Untraceable privacy (UPriv) is defined using the game played between a malicious adversary and a collection of reader and tag instances. runs the game whose setting is as follows.
Phase 1 (Learning): is able to send any Execute, Send, and Corrupt queries at will.
Phase 2 (Challenge):
1. At some point during , will choose a fresh session on which to be tested and send a Test query corresponding to the test session. Note that the test session chosen must be fresh, which means the party has not been sent a Corrupt query. Depending on a randomly chosen bit b∈{0, 1}, is given b from the set { 0 , 1 }.
2.
continues making any Execute, Send, and Corrupt queries at will, subjected to the restrictions that the parties have not been sent Corrupt queries. 
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Copyright ⓒ 2013 SERSC Definition 2 (Tag Unforgeability) Our definition of tag unforgeability (TUF) for the proposed protocol characterizes the ability of adversary TUF to clone valid-looking tags in an RFID system. TUF is defined using the game TUF played between a malicious adversary TUF and a collection of reader and tag instances, in which TUF interacts with the reader and with tags for an arbitrary period of time determined by TUF . TUF runs the game TUF whose setting is as follows.
Phase 1 (Learning):
TUF is able to send any Execute, Send queries at will.
Phase 2 (Challenge):
In the challenge phase, the adversary TUF has no oracle access to tags. TUF outputs a message to query ℛ until ℛ yields some output γ.
if ℛ accept then output '1' ; else output '0' ; Then, TUF terminates the game simulation. 
Definition 3 (Reader Unforgeability)
Reader unforgeability (RUF) is defined using the game RUF played between a malicious adversary RUF and a collection of reader and tag instances, in which RUF interacts with the reader and with tags for an arbitrary period of time determined by RUF . RUF runs the game RUF whose setting is as follows.
Phase 1 (Learning):
RUF is able to send any Execute, Send queries at will.
Phase 2 (Challenge):
In the challenge phase, the adversary RUF has no oracle access to readers. RUF outputs a message to query until yields some output η.
if accept then output '1' ; else output '0' ; Then, RUF terminates the game simulation. The goal of RUF is to cause to accept at least once. The success of RUF in winning RUF and thus breaking the notion of RUF is quantified in terms of RUF 's advantage in causing to output "η = 1". This is denoted by 
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A protocol in an RFID system with security parameter k is reader unforgeable if:
Definition 4 (Forward Security) Our definition of forward security (FS) for the proposed protocol characterizes the ability of adversary FS to obtain the tag's previous secret keys when FS 
Security Analysis of the Anonymous RFID Authentication Protocol
Review of the Anonymous RFID Authentication Protocol
The anonymous RFID authentication protocol proposed by Shen et.al [1] is depicted in Figure 1 . All the used notations are showed in Table 1 . Even though the paper [1] provides strong privacy and security with low computation and communication cost, there are still two vulnerabilities under the above security model. . Thus, the ID of the tag is revealed. Next, the adversary has got the protocol transcripts of session i-1
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